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A Note on the Logic of Worldly Ground 
(accepted for publication in Thought) 
STEPHAN KRÄMER & STEFAN ROSKI 
 
Abstract: In his 2010 paper ‘Grounding and Truth-Functions’, Fabrice Correia has developed 
the first and so far only proposal for a logic of ground based on a worldly conception of 
facts. In this paper, we show that the logic allows the derivation of implausible grounding 
claims. We then generalize these results and draw some conclusions concerning the 
structural features of ground and its associated notion of relevance which has so far not 
received the attention it deserves. 
 
§1. Introduction 
Kit Fine is a British philosopher. However, not all philosophers are British. For example, 
there are also American philosophers. Now, does this latter fact – that there are American 
philosophers – hold partly because, or in virtue of the fact that Fine is a philosopher? It 
seems not. Given that Fine is British, it seems that his being a philosopher does not 
contribute at all to bringing it about, or making it the case, that there are American 
philosophers. We show that an otherwise attractive-seeming logic for ground, more precisely 
a logic for what is often called a worldly conception of ground, yields contrary results, and 
discuss what conclusions should be drawn from this. 
§2 introduces the notion of worldly ground and highlights some of the 
philosophically and technically attractive advantages it seems to enjoy in comparison with its 
rivals. §3 proves the seemingly untoward results in the most well-developed logic of worldly 
ground, proposed by Fabrice Correia (2010), and discusses the results in informal terms, 
highlighting some costs of accepting it. §4 presents alternative derivations of the result, and 
connects it to certain structural principles about ground and the kind of relevance that 
grounding involves. §5 explores that connection further. §6 explores how adherents of a 
worldly conception of ground may react in view of our results and concludes. 
 
§2. Worldly ground 
Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in the notion of ground, where ground is 
taken to be a kind of non-causal priority among facts. A standard way to motivate this notion 
is to point to certain uses of the sentential connective ‘because’ or to uses of the phrase ‘in 
virtue of’ and cognate phrases that are particularly widespread in philosophical discourse.1 
Claims to the effect (i) that someone is in a given mental state in virtue of being in a certain 
physical state, or (ii) that a given ball is red or round because it is red, are typical examples 
of statements of ground. We shall assume that such statements express that a relation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This is not the place to give a comprehensive introduction to the debate. For this consider Correia 
and Schnieder 2012 and Trogdon 2013. 
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ground obtains between certain facts.2 For instance, (ii) expresses that the fact that a given 
ball is red or round is grounded in the fact that it is red. 
Theories of ground can be seen as attempts to account for the philosophical use of 
‘in virtue of’ and the relation thereby expressed. Intuitions on pertinent uses of ‘because’ or 
‘in virtue of’ are therefore not only helpful to motivate the notion of ground, they also 
provide a crucial, if defeasible, test of adequacy for proposed theories of ground. In 
particular, if a theory entails an inacceptable ‘in virtue of’-claim, this is a prima facie reason 
to reject it. This, at least, is common practice among participants of the debate, and we will 
follow it.3 
There is a standard distinction between conceptualist and factualist, or worldly 
conceptions of ground.4 According to the factualist conception, grounding relates relatively 
coarse-grained ‘worldly’ facts, whereas on the conceptualist view, the grounding relation is 
in general highly sensitive to how the facts in question are conceptualized.5 While this issue 
is relevant for a host of topics related to grounding, we will focus on how it affects the logic 
of ground, i.e. the principles and rules that govern the interaction between ground and the 
logical connectives. Several conceptualists have proposed systems by the lights of which the 
fact that A grounds, for instance, the fact that A ∧ A, the fact that A ∨ A, and the fact that 
¬¬A.6 Factualists would deny this.7 For on a worldly conception of facts, the fact that A is 
arguably the same as the facts that A ∧ A, A ∨ A and ¬¬A – albeit each time represented 
under a different guise. Given that grounding is irreflexive, factualists thus cannot allow for 
any grounding relations obtaining in these cases. This does not mean that they cannot hold 
on to the intuition that, e.g., conjunctive facts are grounded in their conjuncts. This will be 
the case, however, only if the given conjunctive fact is really different from its conjuncts. 
It is not clear that the conceptualist and the factualist conceptions of ground 
represent mutually exclusive options; they might simply capture different, though related 
phenomena, both worthy of investigation. To the extent to which they are seen as competing 
views, however, we want to highlight three points that seem to favour the factualist 
conception. 
a. The worldly conception seems more natural given a standard way to motivate both 
the viability and the importance of the notion of ground. For this is usually done by 
appealing to a picture of reality as a layered structure (cf. deRosset 2013; Bennett 2011). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 We make this assumption purely for ease of expression; nothing in our argument turns on whether 
ground is strictly a relation between facts. (For discussion, see Correia and Schnieder 2012a: 10ff.) 
3 Cf., e.g., Correia 2010: 263. 
4 Cf. e.g. Correia 2010: 256f; Correia and Schnieder 2012: 14f.  
5 Whether one wants to still call those relata facts or perhaps rather true propositions is of no matter 
for present purposes. We continue to talk about facts for brevity’s sake. Note that on both conceptions, 
grounding is hyperintensional, and does not in general allow even logically equivalent sentences to be 
interchanged salva veritate. Moreover, there are disagreements in both camps as to just how fine- or 
coarse-grained the relata are to be construed. 
6 This holds in Fine’s (2012) Impure Logic of Ground and also given the principles proposed by 
Rosen (2009: 117ff.). Related results can be obtained in Schnieder’s Logic of ‘Because’ (2011). 
7 This holds at least for Correia (2010), on whose system we shall concentrate below. Perhaps not all 
factualists will give the same verdict on the case. Audi (2010: 700f) takes the relation to be even more 
coarse-grained.  
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According to such a picture, the world is not a mere aggregate of facts, but falls into several 
layers that are connected by various relations of priority. Grounding is then thought of as one 
such relation. On this kind of view, therefore, grounding emerges as a relation among 
constituents of the world that exist, and can be individuated, independently of our conceptual 
(or linguistic) representations of them – a relation that carves reality at its joints. Yet, the 
conceptualists’ account of ground does not seem to pay this picture its proper due in that it 
introduces distinctions that are unduly sensitive to our conceptualizations of reality (cf. 
Correia (2010: 258f)). In other words, conceptualists conflate mere shadows of language 
with real features of the world. 
b. A related worry is that even on the conceptualist view, there should be some non-
trivial notion of ‘saying the same thing’ under which the following schema is valid (‘[A]’ 
abbreviates ‘the fact that A’): 
EQUIV  a) If A and B say the same thing and [A] grounds [C], then [B] grounds [C]. 
b) If C and D say the same thing and [A] grounds [C], then [A] grounds [D]. 
For, surely, not every linguistic difference should make for a difference in ground-theoretic 
status.8 But so far, conceptualists have not come up with a viable general criterion to account 
for that intuition. 
c. Finally, conceptualists have not yet shown that the logics they propose are 
sufficiently well-behaved. For, although the proof-theoretic side of logics of conceptual 
ground is by now fairly well investigated (cf. esp. Fine 2012), there is still no semantics 
relative to which we could prove soundness and completeness for the deductive systems. 
Using an elegant and well-motivated variant of situation semantics (called truth-maker 
semantics), Fine (2011) establishes soundness and completeness for a set of structural rules 
for various grounding-operators. As noted in his (2012: 74), however, rules for the 
interaction between grounding-operators and the truth-functors that are widely accepted 
among conceptualists turn out to be unsound under this semantics. Strikingly, this is 
precisely because the semantics cannot discriminate among the semantic values of, e.g. A 
and A ∨ A. 
As we have already seen, the factualist conception takes the idea of grounding as a 
joint-carving, worldly relation, more seriously. Moreover, in his (2010), Correia has 
developed a logic of worldly ground that puts this idea on a firm formal footing. Crucially, 
Correia has offered a semantics with respect to which his logic is provably sound and 
complete. And while the semantics and some aspects of the logic may seem somewhat 
contrived, Fine has pointed out that a modified version of his truth-maker semantics allows 
for a very natural definition of a notion of ground that agrees with Correia’s (cf. Fine (ms. 
b:11)). Finally, on the Correia/Fine view, a principled account of the notion of saying the 
same thing relevant to EQUIV is possible; in particular, its logic is that of Angell’s (1977) 
notion of analytic equivalence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Cf. Correia (2010: 266), where he makes some suggestions on behalf of the conceptualist. Schnieder 
(2010) discusses a closely related point.  
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The prospects for worldly ground thus look good. It takes the idea of ground as a 
joint-carving, worldly relation seriously, and appears to have a well-behaved logic in the 
system proposed by Correia. However, we will show that these apparent advantages 
notwithstanding, all is not well for proponents of worldly ground. 
 
§3. The argument 
The only properly developed proposal for a logic of worldly ground is that of Correia (2010). 
This section proves that Correia’s logic entails a close cousin of the above implausible claim 
of ground (cf. §1).9 
Central to Correia’s approach is a notion of factual equivalence (≈), the role of 
which is to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for two formulae being, under any 
interpretation, interchangeable in the scope of ground (<). Correia takes the logic of ≈ to be 
Angell’s logic of analytic equivalence. At first glance, that logic seems well suited to the 
task. On the one hand, analytic equivalence is narrower even than equivalence in the logic of 
first-degree entailment. Correia’s idea can thereby allow for pairs like A and A ∨ (A ∧ B) 
being factually inequivalent, and thus for the former to ground the latter (cf. Correia 2010: 
263). On the other hand, the characteristic kinds of pairs over which factualists and 
conceptualists are divided, like A and A ∨ A come out factually equivalent. It is therefore 
reasonable to hope that analytic equivalence is sufficiently fine-grained, but not too fine-
grained, to play the role of factual equivalence in the factualist’s system. 
For our present purposes, the main thing that matters about factual equivalence is 
that it satisfies the law of distribution of ∨ over ∧: 
(X) A ∨ (B ∧ C) ≈ (A ∨ B) ∧ (A ∨ C) 
We further make use of the following rules for ground:10,11 
(∧-Introduction) A; B; (A ∧ B) !≈ A; (A ∧ B) !≈ B / A, B < A ∧ B 
(∨-Introduction) A; (A ∨ B) !≈ A / A < A ∨ B 
B; (A ∨ B) !≈ B / B < A ∨ B 
(Factivity)  Γ < C / C  
Γ, A < C / A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 After we finished the paper, Correia informed us that he has independently discovered the same 
problem for his logic of factual equivalence, and develops an improvement in an as yet unpublished 
manuscript called ‘On the Logic of Factual Eqiuvalence’. 
10 The rules are written in the format ‘Premise; Premise; … / Conclusion’. The semi-colon is used to 
separate premises, and the comma to separate the sentences in the left-hand argument place of <, 
which can be occupied by any finite number of sentences. We have changed Correia’s notation to that 
employed in Fine’s papers. By ‘!≈’ we denote lack of factual equivalence (i.e. ‘A !≈ B’ abbreviates 
‘¬(A ≈ B)’). 
11 Note that Correia (2010: 269) in the end replaces the introduction rules by refinements in which the 
appeal to factual inequivalence is replaced by one to lack of conjunctive-disjunctive containment, i.e. 
factual equivalence of a premise to some disjunction of conjunctions, one of which contains the 
conclusion as a conjunct. The change has no real effect on the uses we make of the rules. 
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(Cut)   Γ < B; B, Δ < C / Γ, Δ < C 
The ∧-Introduction rule captures the intuitive thought that a true conjunction is grounded by 
its conjuncts, provided it is not factually equivalent to either. (If it is, the irreflexivity of 
ground prevents it from being grounded by the conjuncts.) The ∨-Introduction rules capture 
the intuitive thought that a true disjunction is grounded by any true disjunct, provided it is 
not factually equivalent with it. The Factivity rules encode the compelling principle that only 
truths are grounded and that only truths are grounds. The Cut rule, finally, captures the 
plausible view that grounding is transitive. 
Consider any statements A, B, and C such that A and B are true, C is either true or 
false, and the following four assumptions concerning lack of factual equivalence hold: 
(A1)  (A ∨ C) !≈ A 
(A2)  (A ∨ B) !≈ B 
(A3) ((A ∨ B) ∧ (A ∨ C)) !≈ (A ∨ B) 
(A4) ((A ∨ B) ∧ (A ∨ C)) !≈ (A ∨ C) 
(A1)–(A4) are weak assumptions that come out true for most choices of statements A, B, and 
C.12 
The rules of ∨-Introduction yield 
(1) A < A ∨ C 
(2) B < A ∨ B 
Since A ∨ C and A ∨ B are true, ∧-Introduction and two applications of Cut yield 
(3) A, B < (A ∨ B) ∧ (A ∨ C) 
By (X), it follows that 
(4) A, B < A ∨ (B ∧ C) 
We maintain that (4) has many instances that are implausible, even though the corresponding 
instances of the assumptions of our derivation are true. 
Our first example is very close to the one with which we began this paper. It is a 
standard view that as far as grounding is concerned, an existential quantification like 
‘someone is an American philosopher’ is just like the corresponding (potentially infinite) 
disjunction. If so, then we may paraphrase the quantification by ‘someone other than Fine is 
an American philosopher ∨ Fine is an American philosopher’. The second disjunct is 
plausibly ground-theoretically equated with the conjunction ‘Fine is a philosopher ∧ Fine is 
American’. It is easy to check that if we set A to ‘someone other than Fine is an American 
philosopher’, B to ‘Fine is a philosopher’ and C to ‘Fine is American’, all our premises come 
out true. So we obtain the conclusion that the fact that someone is an American philosopher 
is grounded by the facts that someone other than Fine is an American philosopher, and that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Using the refined rules (cp. the previous footnote), we instead require assumptions stating lack of 
conjunctive-disjunctive containment. These are still true for most choices of A, B, and C. Roughly, as 
long as our A, B, and C have independent truth-makers, the assumptions all turn out true. 
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Fine is a philosopher. In other words, this last fact helps ground the fact that someone is an 
American philosopher. But this is implausible given an understanding of ground that is 
mediated by our intuitive understanding of ‘in virtue of’. For, we would not say that the fact 
that there are American philosophers obtains partially in virtue of some non-American (Fine) 
being a philosopher. 
We note two ways of dramatizing the result. First, we can let C, and thus B ∧ C, be 
necessarily false. For instance, let A mean that something is a prime number, B that 4 is a 
number, and C that 4 is prime. It seems highly implausible to hold that the fact that 
something is a prime number is due in part to the fact that 4 is a number. Second, we may 
even set C to ¬B, obtaining that B helps ground A ∨ (B ∧ ¬B).13 This seems most counter-
intuitive, for it implies that for any truth A and any claim B, the fact that A ∨ (B ∧ ¬B) is 
due in part to either B or ¬B. Consider the fact that snow is white or the number of hairs on 
my head is both odd and even. Clearly, that this fact obtains is not due even in part to the 
number of hairs on my head being odd, or due to that number being even, whichever is in 
fact the case. 
We conclude that Correia’s logic of ground has implausible results. While the appeal 
to analytic equivalence permits us to abstract from mere differences in representation such as 
may seem to obtain between A and A ∨ A, it does so at the cost of obliterating real 
distinctions tracked by our informal understanding of ‘in virtue of’ and cognate phrases. 
 
§4. Variations 
It is instructive to note that we can also obtain similar results by appealing to resources that 
bear no obvious connection to the distributivity principle (X) appealed to before. The basis 
of these derivations is a structural principle of convexity for ground. It says that if a given 
truth C is grounded by some collection of facts as well as a subset of the same collection of 
facts, then it is grounded by any collection of facts that lies between these two, i.e. which is 
both a subset of the first and a superset of the second collection: 
CONVEXITY: Γ < C; Γ, Δ, E < C / Γ, Δ < C 
Now if A, B, C are all true, we can (typically14) show both that A < A ∨ (B ∧ C) and that A, 
B, C < A ∨ (B ∧ C). By CONVEXITY, it then follows that A, B < A ∨ (B ∧ C). This is like 
the above case, only that here we had to assume that C is true. 
We are tempted to suggest that typical instances of this grounding claim should be 
rejected. Roughly, it seems to us that some collection that includes B can only constitute a 
full ground of A ∨ (B ∧ C) if it also includes C. We admit, though, that intuitions about the 
appropriate use of ‘in virtue of’ et al on their own lend only limited support to this 
contention. Consider the fact that Quine is an American philosopher ∨ (Fine is a philosopher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This slightly reduces the number of statements for which (A1)–(A4) are true. Again, it suffices to 
assign statements with independent truth-makers to A and B to ensure that the assumptions hold good.  
14 Modulo the relevant conditions of factual inequivalence; this caveat will be left implicit in what 
follows. 
	   7	  
∧ Fine is British). Does this fact obtain wholly in virtue of the facts that Quine is an 
American philosopher and that Fine is a philosopher? Or is it only the fact that Quine is an 
American on its own, which fully grounds the disjunctive fact? Intuition does not seem to 
decide the case. 
However, in the presence of some additional plausible assumptions, CONVEXITY 
also implies the results previously found to be unacceptable. Firstly, according to a very 
popular view, grounding is an internal relation in the sense that if some facts Γ ground 
another C, they do so in every world in which all of Γ and C obtain.15 
INTERNALITY: Γ < C → □((⋀Γ ∧ C) → Γ < C) 
Now assume that grounding is necessarily internal and that A and B are true. Assume further 
that A ∧ B ∧ C is contingently false, so C is contingently false and compossible with A and 
B. Then in any world in which A, B and C are all true, we have A, B < A ∨ (B ∧ C). But 
since grounding is internal in every world, and all of A, B, and A ∨ (B ∧ C) obtain in the 
actual world, it follows that in the actual world A, B < A ∨ (B ∧ C). So every instance of 
this schema which is derivable by the above method, and in which A, B, and C are 
compossible, can also be obtained from CONVEXITY and INTERNALITY. 
Secondly, it is plausible that we should also recognize a non-factive counterpart of the notion 
of ground.16 If so, it seems natural to think that a structural principle like CONVEXITY should 
hold for non-factive ground (<∘) if it holds for factive ground: 
CONVEXITY*: Γ <∘ C; Γ, Δ, E <∘ C / Γ, Δ <∘ C 
Given the obvious connecting principle that if Γ <∘ C and ⋀Γ ∧ C, then Γ < C, we can then 
derive all the above unwelcome results. 
Since Correia’s logic for ground does not have modal operators, INTERNALITY is not 
derivable in it. Still, it is a very plausible seeming claim, and one that Correia has elsewhere 
committed himself to. CONVEXITY provably holds in Correia’s logic.17 As for CONVEXITY*, 
Correia has no operator for non-factive ground in his system, but it is clear what would 
correspond semantically to such an operator. If we were to introduce <∘ accordingly, 
CONVEXITY* would be derivable.18 We conclude that the most plausible way of avoiding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Correia (2005: 61) and (2014a: 88), Bennett (2011: 32f), Audi (2012: 697) and deRosset (2013: 20) 
all accept principles that clearly entail INTERNALITY. Also Fine (2012: 76) accepts it. Leuenberger 
(2014) presents counterexamples to INTERNALITY. 
16 See e.g., Fine (2012: 48f) and Correia (2014b: 36).  
17 Proof sketch: Say that C is disjunctively contained in A (A ≥d C) iff A is factually equivalent to 
some disjunction of which C is a disjunct. Application of Correia’s Reduction Theorem (2010: 19) to 
the premises and conclusion of CONVEXITY reveals that it suffices to show that if the conjunction of 
the sentences Γ and the conjunction of the sentences in Γ, Δ, and E is disjunctively contained in C, 
then so is the conjunction of the sentences in Γ and Δ. This can be shown essentially by applications 
of the distributivity of ∨ over ∧ and ∧ over ∨ as well as the fact that A ≈ A ∨ A ≈ A ∧ A. We should 
note that Correia voices some dissatisfaction with the Reduction Theorem. However, against the 
background of Fine’s truthmaker semantics, it seems perfectly well motivated. 
18 The proof is a proper part of the proof of CONVEXITY sketched above. 
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results of §3 also involves a rejection of the principles of convexity.19 As we see it, their 
problematic character also points to an important fact about the notion of relevance that 
guides central intuitions invoked by theorists of ground. We elaborate on this issue in the 
next section. 
 
§5. Relevance 
It is commonly held that one of the distinctive features of the notion of ground is that it 
imposes a constraint of relevance on the grounds of a given fact; it is this feature of the 
notion which renders it non-monotonic, i.e. such that adding arbitrary facts to a ground of a 
fact does not in general yield another ground of that fact.20 In addition, the notion of full 
ground imposes a constraint of sufficiency: if some facts are to constitute a full ground of 
some further fact, then their obtaining must in some appropriate understanding be sufficient 
for the grounded fact’s obtaining. Metaphorically speaking, these two constraints put bounds 
on the set of a fact’s full grounds both from below and from above. It is bound “from below” 
by the sufficiency constraint, which forces us to put enough into a given collection of facts 
that they are jointly sufficient for the fact to be grounded. It is bound “from above” by the 
relevance constraint, which prevents us from enlarging the collection of facts that is to be the 
ground in arbitrary ways.21 
It is plausible to suppose that the two constraints, on some suitable understanding, 
are jointly sufficient: if a collection of facts Γ is, in the appropriate senses, both sufficient 
and relevant for the obtaining of fact C, then Γ < C. At any rate, it seems very unclear what 
constraints might be satisfied in all typical examples for ground that cannot plausibly be 
subsumed under either the heading of sufficiency or that of relevance. But then it may seem 
as though ground should satisfy Convexity. For suppose that (i) Γ < C and (ii) Γ, Δ, E < C. 
Then by (i) Γ, Δ is sufficient for C. Moreover, by (ii), a superset of Γ, Δ is relevant for C, so 
Γ, Δ must also be relevant. What our discussion shows is that this very tempting line of 
reasoning must be flawed somehow. 
We would like to suggest that the flaw consists in an overly simplistic picture of 
relevance. We assumed, in effect, that if a given collection is relevant in the pertinent sense 
to a given fact, so is any subset of that collection. This follows immediately if the notion of 
relevance is understood distributively, so that the relevance of a given collection consists 
simply in the relevance of each member. We are inclined to hold that a notion of relevance 
that can do justice to our intuitive understanding of ‘in virtue of’ must be understood 
collectively, so that some facts can jointly be relevant to another without each member on its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 There is an intriguing connection between Convexity and (X) in Fine’s truthmaker semantics for 
worldly ground (cf. Fine, ms b). In that semantics, both turn crucially on a condition of convexity that 
Fine imposes on ground-theoretic content: that if something is both a part of a truthmaker of a 
proposition and has a truthmaker of the same proposition as part, then that object is itself a truthmaker 
of the proposition. It would be very interesting to investigate the logics of factual equivalence and 
ground obtained by dropping the condition of convexity on Finean propositions. 
20 See e.g. Fine (2012a: 56f; 2012b: 2), Dasgupta (2014: 4), Schnieder (2011: 450), and Correia (2010: 
11f). 
21 We owe the picture to Fine (ms a). 
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own, or indeed arbitrary subcollections, being thus relevant. In particular, we suggest that A, 
B, C are jointly relevant, in the appropriate sense, to A ∨ (B ∧ C), but A, B is not. The 
reason is that B is relevant only in combination with either C or a full ground of C. As long 
as A is neither, the collection A, B is not suitably relevant for A ∨ (B ∧ C). 
 
§6. Conclusion 
We have shown that an initially plausible logic attempting to take the intuition of grounding 
as a worldly relation seriously entails unacceptable consequences. How can an adherent of a 
worldly conception of ground react? Perhaps the most natural option is modifying the logic. 
Our derivations relied on either the distributivity principle (X) for factual equivalence or the 
CONVEXITY-principles. One thus might consider giving up these principles. However, since 
this would involve giving up on Angell’s system as a guide for interchangeability in the 
scope of <, factualists would lose their respective principled account – one of the advantages 
Correia’s logic seemed to offer. It is also unclear whether such a modified notion of factual 
equivalence allows for a well-behaved logical system – a second advantage the notion 
seemed to enjoy compared to conceptualist views. The question whether the notion of 
worldly ground has an attractive logic, and how it compares to conceptualist rivals, is still 
open.22 
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